Sargent and Sims (2011)

Today, the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (yes, this is the long and formal title for the Nobel in economics), was awarded to Thomas J. Sargent and Christopher A. Sims. The following caption summarizes the motivation:

“for their empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy”

The longer motivation, and survey of the recipients’ academic contributions, can be found here (pdf 600 Kb).

As a macroeconomist, I can only support this choice. These are definitely two of the profession’s “grand old men”, and it is difficult to write a modern paper without citing either of them, or both. Their influence in theoretical and empirical macroeconomics has been, and is, enormous, and in these days where macroeconomists by many camps are considered technocrats out of touch with reality, it is particularly nice to see that the prize is awarded for Sargent and Sims’ contributions to empirical macroeconomics.

The VAR evidence hiding in any economy, as Sims has directed us to, is what any theoretical modeller must seek to match. And the structural empirical models that Sargent has suggested, is what we need to put up, if we want to understand why an economy acts like it does and how it reacts to different policy measures.

So, as the committee emphasizes, two complementary approaches to empirical macroeconomics are being honored. And for those who continue to believe that macroeconomists are fools believing that rational expectations are everywhere a realistic description of economic behavior, it is ironic (in a positive sense) that both laureates have made progress in developing models featuring non-rational expectations. They have done this for decades, but critics of modern macroeconomics, of course, don’t bother reading.

Congratulations to Sargent and Sims!

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Come on Baby, Let’s Do the Twist!

After yesterday’s press release by the Fed, many commentators started talking about “Operation Twist” even though no such thing is mentioned in the release. Accompanying the press release on the Federal Reserve site, was, however, a document containing the term in parenthesis. Some could immediately be confused or even scared by this. Would this be yet an addition to the endless series of acronyms that has emerged during the financial crisis? Troubled and Worthless Interest-bearing Securities Task-force?

Luckily not. It just reflects a return to the old days. And “twist” actually means what it says: “twist.”  In 1961, the Kennedy administration and the Fed engaged in an operation of selling short-term bonds and buying up longer term bonds. The aim was to “twist” the yield curve, and since it was in the days of Chubby Checker’s hit seen in the clip, the connotation to the dance was made.

People may not be dancing the twist anymore in the US, but nevertheless the Fed is now trying to twist the yield curve: Until June 2012 it will sell for $400 bn. in short-term bonds and buy up long-term bonds in an effort to lower yields on long-term bonds and their close substitutes (say, mortgage bonds). Yet another “unconventional” move (in addition to quantitative easing), now that the policy rate is essentially at zero (the decision on the policy rate was left unchanged, and as was the specific mention of how long it would be kept low; see earlier post on this). The goal is to live up to the part of the Fed’s dual mandate focusing on maximum sustainable employment.

The announcement has already had some effect. The yield on a 30-year government bond is down 35 basis point (from 3.20% Wednesday morning to 2.85% Thursday at 1 pm). The issue is whether much more can be expected when the Fed actually starts doing the twist? Most believe that it didn’t work in 1961, and even if it works a little, on may doubt whether this is sufficient in a situation with persistent and high unemployment. It may, on the other hand, not be damaging, except for the fact that the consolidated public sector afterwards will have a debt that costs more interest.

Another matter is that the Fed now have exhausted all of Ben Bernanke’s ways of “Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates” as listed by Bernanke and Vincent R. Reinhart (2004, American Economic Review 94, 85-90): I. Shaping Interest-Rate Expectations; II. Altering the Composition of the Central Bank’s Balance Sheet;  III. Expanding the Size of the Central Bank’s Balance Sheet.

So, what will come next?

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ECB too Strong for Stark

Officially, member of the ECB’s executive board Jürgen Stark has decided to quit his position prematurely for “personal reasons” (mentioned twice in the brief press release). This can, of course, cover a lot, but does not exclude what is on most people’s mind: He is quitting because he is in opposition to ECB’s actions on the European bond market. Like his fellow contryman, German Axel Weber, he has obviously not been pleased by the ECB’s slow but steadily increasing involvement in fiscal affairs. It is well known that decisions to purchase sovereign debt in the secondary market (which just about makes it constitutionally legal), have not been unanimous, and although a secret, many have guessed that Jürgen Stark has been one of those voting against.

So, as Weber did before him, Stark is now leaving the ECB. Irrespective of what you think of the man’s political stands (he is known to be quite a hardliner when it comes to monetary policy), his decision shows a lot of personal integrity. He has been against the bond purchases, and as I have written several times on this blog (e.g., here and here where his former colleague, and fellow countryman, Otmar Issing’s critique is mentioned), the Securities Markets Programme cannot in any way be seen as being in conformity with the intentions of the Treaty of the European Union. So, with the risk of generalizing, there seems to be something about Germans: They take treaties seriously.

Therefore, they cannot participate in the workings of an organization which slowly is undermining its own constitutional foundation. That is the way to act! It is a clear signal saying that in these days and times, we do not need rules and regulations to be taken lightly.

I would say, IF you want to purchase government bonds, then change the constitution and go “all in” (bad sports metaphor apology extended). For example, as suggested by Charles Wyplosz, the ECB could promise to guarantee all public debt in the Euro zone. Then, the ECB would be a de facto and de jure lender of last resort. That would be clear and understandable. Now we are in a messy situation where the ECB is performing relatively small interventions based on a lot of fuzzy talk about securing the monetary transmission mechanism so they can fulfill their inflation target!

I am, however, not so sure about the lender of last resort solution. While it could definitely bring current rates down for some countries, I believe the moral hazard problems would become too severe (and as the EMU grows, they grow bigger and bigger). So I would prefer that the ECB lived up to the intentions of the Treaty, and concentrated on doing monetary policy independent of politicians’ desires. I guess it is something like that Jürgen Stark had in mind as well.

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Krugman on “Republican Science”: Can we please make a trade barrier against that?

This is an endorsement. Paul Krugman’s recent Op-Ed in the New York Times describes in horrifying detail how some parts of America, and potential Republican Presidential candidates are turning their back against science. The piece, Republicans Against Science, is really scary. Read it and weep.

The Wall Street Journal editorial by a Stephen Moore that Krugman mentions, can be found here. It is also a horrifying read. It basically says that economics is stupid, and common sense is better. Weep some more.

It is scary right now for me, as my country have an election campaign where main issues are economic. And since American tendencies inevitably are imported in Europe at some time, I beg that it will take a little while before most politicians here (and elsewhere in Europe) start hailing “common sense” over science. Some morons, of course, already do, but some can still accept a scientifically based argument. Still.

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ECB public debt purchases by numbers

I wrote last week about the ECB’s renewed purchases of public Euro debt (in particular Spanish and Italian). Now the actual numbers are out, and the confirm what market participants signaled: The ECB was not in for a small operation.

The ECB purchased for around 22 billion Euros, thereby raising its stock of debt purchased under the Securities Markets Programme to 96 billion Euros. An unprecedented increase in the stock of almost 30 %. Today, the ECB will suck up the associated liquidity created (and will do so the next week, and the next . . . ).

From a weekly perspective, the operation appeared successful as bond yields have dropped to around 5% for both countries (although, of course, many bond yields went down last week). But is this really the objective of the ECB? “Bond yield targeting”?

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Commitment in action: Federal Reserve’s interest-rate “path”

It is a big shame that today’s FOMC meeting is one of those not to be followed by a press conference and a Q&A with Ben Bernanke. The policy decision is one of the more spectacular in recent times. Not because the Fed decided to keep the target for the Federal Funds Rate within the 0–0.25% range, where it has been since December 2008. The big news, however, is that the non-move is accompanied by an explicit commitment to keep it there for the next two years (if current conditions continue). This is very specific compared to previous talk about keeping rates low for “an extended period” (which has been the credo since 2009, and which in April this year was mentioned to be just “a couple meetings”).  Hence, there would have been lots to ask Bernanke about. Also, the fact that three of the ten FOMC members voted against the decision is quite unusual. The opponents—all non Federal Reserve Board members—were Richard W. Fisher (Dallas Fed), Narayana Kocherlakota (Minneapolis Fed), and Charles I. Plosser (Chicago Fed). All preferred that the “extended period”–phrasing had been maintained.

The decision to shift policy so drastically is based on new downward revisions of US GDP-growth, a poor labor market performance, and weak spending activity. The associated firm and explicit commitment to a zero-interest rate policy for (at least) two years is well grounded in modern macroeconomic theory, where the ability to affect expectations is viewed as crucial for successful monetary policy. Keeping rates credibly low for a long time can not only help lowering longer rates, but also help increase inflation expectations (although this is something not to be mentioned in the US these times), such that the real interest rate goes down. Apparently, the wording “an extended period” was just not seen as good enough.

I think it is a bold move to be so specific, and it is interesting to see how it plays out. In the press release accompanying the announcement, it is mentioned that other “policy tools” are discussed on an ongoing basis, but nothing specific is mentioned. Probably this reflects that the number of actual tools is beginning to shrink drastically. This leaves the Fed with just words to affect the economy. Today’s statements are testament to that.

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ECB buys public debt again: Otmar Issing voices strong critique

In a rare Sunday press release (August 7) , the President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet (on behalf of the Governing Council), hailed the fiscal and structural measures of Spain and Italy and their commitments—along with other member countries—to strictly adhere to “fiscal targets”. Then he emphasized that countries are sovereign states that themselves should honor their own “signature as a key element in ensuring financial stability in the euro area as a whole“. (Oh, and he supports the joint statement of the same day by France and Germany, which is not surprising given the occasional word-by-word similarities.) Then he concludes that the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) will be activated. I.e., he praises the countries and then announces that the ECB will commence purchases of their debt.

I have mentioned before, here and here, that I could never have imagined this behavior some years ago, and that this in my view is in gross violation of the intent of the Treaty of the European Union. The legal trick, however, is to conduct the purchases on the secondary market. Moreover, to calm the council members who do not support the SMP, interventions are sterilized on a weekly basis, such that the money supply does not go up. Finally, the argument for the whole operation is that it facilitates the monetary transmission mechanism such that price stability can be achieved. So, presumably the yields on these countries’ bonds are considered to be mis-priced by the market, thus messing up the transmission. If that really is the belief, the ECB could earn tons of money, to the benefits of taxpayers, by selling German bonds and buying Italian. Pure profit guaranteed.

So what happened? Yesterday, market participants reported that the ECB was buying up Spanish and Italian bonds, and their yields did drop substantially. It was, of course, not an ordinary day as it was the first trading day after the Standard & Poor’s downgrade of US debt. So all stock markets plummeted, and investors went in to public debt (take that S&P). So it is difficult to trace out how big effect the ECB purchases had per se, and how much of it was a flight to bonds (even though most investors trying to fly to bonds may have chosen some with a different country name).

Up until Monday the ECB holds around 74 billion Euro worth of public debt. How much has been added cannot yet be seen on the ECB site. Their Ad-Hoc communication of August 8 only covers the size of the SMP up until August 5. So the precise amount of yesterday’s purchases of government bonds remains unknown until next Monday. Judging from market commentators, however, the activity was substantial (and the Sunday press release could also be taken as an indication of that).

Therefore, in all likelihood the role of ECB as a fiscal entity in the Euro zone is gradually increasing. This is a bad idea, as it opens up for politicized monetary policy and breach of central bank independence. It appears that you have to be a former policymaker from ECB to be able to voice such fears in public. Long-time member of the ECB executive board Otmar Issing writes in Financial Times exactly about these dangers. Among his strong statements I close out with these:

“Any attempt to “save” monetary union via agreements which transfer sovereignty to a European level, where violations of fundamental treaties have become a regular event, lacks any logic. In the end it will only further alienate the people from Europe itself”,

and:

“A monetary union with a stable euro can only survive if central bank independence is fully respected. This implies that the European Central Bank abstains from fiscal policy actions. Yet to change the “no bail-out” clause ever more in the direction of a bail-out regime is not a step towards a democratically-legitimised political union. It is a move on a slippery road to a regime of fiscal indiscipline drowning hitherto solid countries in the morass of over-indebtedness.”

My guess is that he is saying what a few current council members only think.

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US of AA+

Rarely has a rating agency’s rating of a single country been met with such anticipation and followed by so much commentary. On August 5, Standard & Poor’s downgraded US long-term sovereign debt from the maximum of “AAA” to “AA+” adding an “Outlook Negative” to the picture. As mentioned all over the press, this is the first time to happen. What is particularly interesting about the downgrade is the motivation. Surely, United States has a huge public debt—of a size that causes even the most Keynesian-minded economists to take it seriously. But the motivation is barely economic at all. As seen in “Research Update: United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered To ‘AA+’ On
Political Risks And Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative
” the motivation is mainly political. In fact, it is one big blow in the face of the US politicians. S&P strongly criticizes the behavior leading up to the increase of the debt ceiling, and raises serious doubts about the politicians’ capabilities of living up to the promises embedded in the compromises which prevented the de facto shutdown of the federal government on August 2. Listen:

The political brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America’s governance and policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously believed. The statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips in the debate over fiscal policy.

Somehow it is difficult to disagree. Somehow it is also strange, to the degree of spooky, that a private organization working out of a seasoned and respected publishing company (McGraw Hill) suddenly can create a near-panic state among market participants, commentators, state leaders and economists all over the globe. And stock markets did plummet today all over the world. Ironically, however, the yield on a 10-year US Treasury Bond dropped by 20 bp since Friday (as of Monday 2.30 pm New York time).

This is enormous power that lies in the hands of a company who is probably not better or worse in judging the American debt problems than other similar institutions or branches of financial institutions, or even single economists. Indeed, some find that they are not even that good at it. Recently, Mike Konzal has written a great piece on rating agencies’ (lack of) good predictions of public debt. This power, however, can be used affect long-term interest rates better than the Federal Reserve would wish it could do. Indeed, in the current motivation for the downgrade, S&P resembles a central bank trying to signal future intentions:

We could lower the long-term rating to ‘AA’ within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.

So, if the S&P’s powers take effect, one could definitely see an interest-rate increase coming, and then we will get another downgrade. If this talk gains momentum in the markets and becomes credible, it can therefore severely worsen the fiscal problems of the US. All because of the opinions of a rating agency?

Well, the US asked for it, as its Securities and Exchange Commission has approved Standard and Poor’s as a NRSRO—Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization. Nevertheless, it does raise a lot of complications with large dominant rating agencies. Simple forecasters now cannot rely on economy analysis, but must also try to forecast what the rating agencies will think about this and that. Also, I couldn’t help thinking about insider trading. With such obvious market power, employees at these institutions sit on valuable, really valuable, information. Obviously, Standard & Poor’s have codes of ethics that forbids employees to use such private information (pdf):

“Employees will not use or share Confidential Information for their personal benefit, including to buy, sell, or sell short Securities about which they possess Confidential Information” (par. 5.5.)

That is reassuring, but I would like to know whether a breach of these ethics is illegal, i.e., subject to the laws of insider trading, or just a way of getting fired from S&P? One could probably live with that if the return is high enough.

Finally, it may be worthwhile to let all market participants and politicians read a bit further into the codes of ethics of S&P:

“Credit Ratings do not constitute investment, financial, or other advice. Credit Ratings are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell a particular Security or to make any other investment decision. Credit Ratings do not comment on the suitability of an investment for a particular investor and should not be relied on when making any investment decision. The assignment of a Credit Rating to a Rated Entity does not guarantee the performance of the Rated Entity. Standard & Poor’s does not act as an investment, financial, or other advisor to, and does not have a fiduciary relationship with, any Issuer, investor, or any other person. Credit Ratings are not verifiable statements of fact.” (par. 7.7.)

So true, so true. So maybe the world could please coordinate on an equilibrium where less emphasis is put on “AAA” versus “AA+”?

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